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Abstract 
Employing a sample of 26,473 firms across 42 countries from 1990 to 2013, we find that firms located 
in countries with higher individualism have higher stock price crash risk. Furthermore, individualism 
can be transmitted by foreign investors from overseas markets to influence local firms’ crash risk, and 
can exacerbate the impact of firm risk taking and earnings management on crash risk. Moreover, the 
positive relation between individualism and crash risk is amplified during the global financial crisis and 
attenuated by enhanced country-level financial information transparency and the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards. 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding the sources of stock price crash risk (hereafter “crash risk”) is of great importance for 
investors and policy makers, especially given that large stock price crashes diminish firm value and 
investor wealth, and even potentially induce financial market instability. Crash risk arises when bad 
news that has been hoarded deliberately by managers accumulates beyond a critical threshold and 
suddenly becomes publicly available to investors (Jin & Myers, 2006). Incentives exist for managers to 
strategically engage in this behavior, as bad news could adversely affect their compensation, 
professional career opportunities, and reputations (Ball, 2009; Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki, 2009). A 
growing body of literature has linked crash risk to various managerial opportunistic behaviors, such as 
risk taking (Callen & Fang, 2015) and earnings management (Hutton, Marcus, & Tehranian, 2009). A 
fundamental factor surprisingly ignored by the existing literature in explaining crash risk from a 
psychological perspective is national culture, which shapes managers’ perceptions of hiding bad news, 
thereby influencing crash risk. This paper examines the impact of individualism, as an important national 
culture dimension, on crash risk around the world. 
We conjecture that individualism functions in three ways to encourage managerial bad news 
hoarding, leading to crash risk. First, when faced with bad news, managers in individualistic countries 
have great career and compensation concerns. As employees, they do not expect to be cared for by their 
employers beyond the scope of their work contract (Hofstede, 2005). Underperforming managers are 
thus likely to be dismissed. In addition, their compensation is structured to accommodate individual 
contribution (Hofstede, 1980; Jackson & Schuler, 1995). Performance-based compensation is 
prevalently used (Schuler & Rogovsky, 1998). Hence, to safeguard their job and/or protect their 
compensation, they tend to withhold bad news (Kothari et al., 2009). Second, these managers generally 
enjoy a high degree of autonomy that allows them flexibility in self-governance to adopt their own 
choices (Gray, 1988; Han, Kang, Salter, & Yoo, 2010). If bad news hoarding is at their discretion and 
to their benefit, they are likely to practice this behavior. Third, these managers’ strong self-enhancement 
tendency (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) motivates them to hide bad news that contradicts their positive 
self-view. However, the non-sustainability of the bad news hoarding can result in stock price crashes.  
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Using a sample of 26,473 firms across 42 countries from 1990 to 2013, we examine how a 
country’s score on Hofstede’s individualism index affects three crash risk measures: the negative 
skewness of firm-specific weekly returns (NCSKEW); the down-to-up volatility of firm-specific weekly 
returns (DUVOL); and the number of crash weeks minus the number of jump weeks over a given year 
(COUNT). Our regression results show that individualism is positively and significantly related to all 
three crash risk measures, suggesting that firms located in more individualistic countries exhibit higher 
crash risk. 
Hofstede’s other cultural dimensions are also found to influence crash risk. First, we report lower 
crash risk in higher power-distance countries, where managers engaging in bad news hoarding would 
face more severe disapproval and punishment from their superiors. Second, we report high crash risk in 
masculine countries, where, as expected, managers tend to conceal bad news to sustain their career 
prospects and compensation levels in their pursuit of material success. Third, uncertainty avoidance 
mitigates crash risk, which corroborates the notion that managers in uncertainty-avoiding countries try 
to avoid the strong uncertainty—and hence high anxiety—associated with bad news hoarding. 
Individualism does not arise solely from domestic national culture; it could also be transmitted by 
foreign investors from their home countries. In line with this argument, we show that the capital inflow 
from a foreign country with an individualism score higher (lower) than that of the host country increases 
(decreases) the crash risk of host-country recipient firms. This relation indicates that foreign investors 
can disseminate their home-country individualistic cultures to the host country, thereby shaping host-
country managers’ crash-related values and behaviors through socialization. 
Expanding on the existing evidence that risk taking and earnings management provide motives 
and vehicles for managers to hide bad news (Callen & Fang, 2015; Hutton et al., 2009), we find that 
individualism exacerbates the positive effects of risk taking and earnings management on crash risk. 
This finding suggests that individualism can encourage these bad-news-hoarding-related activities of 
managers, which in turn amplify crash risk.  
Complementing Jin and Myers (2006), who argue that enhanced country-level financial 
information transparency dampens managers’ ability to hide bad news, we show that the positive impact 
of individualism on crash risk is less pronounced in countries with higher financial information 
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transparency. This evidence highlights the importance of establishing transparent financial disclosure 
systems to curtail crash risk in high individualism countries.  
We verify that the positive link between individualism and crash risk holds across 10 census 
geographic regions in the United States. By employing an accounting restatement setting, we further 
show that managers in individualistic regions tend to hide and accumulate adverse firm-specific earnings 
information until it can no longer be concealed and has to be released through restatements, which 
precipitate stock price crashes. This finding reinforces our argument that the heightened bad news 
hoarding in individualistic cultures induces crash risk.  
Based on exogenous market events, we show that the positive relation between individualism and 
crash risk was strengthened during the global financial crisis, and that the improved financial reporting 
quality following the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) attenuates this 
relation. Finally, we find that firms in more individualistic countries experience a larger drop in the stock 
price during crashes. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it adds to the research on 
the impact of formal and informal institutions on crash risk. One related study is conducted by DeFond, 
Hung, Li, and Li (2014), who focus on the adoption of formal accounting rules across countries. As 
regards informal institutions, Callen and Fang (2015) investigate how religion affects the crash risk of 
U.S. firms. Although religion has been used as a proxy for national culture in previous studies (e.g., La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Stulz & Williamson, 2003) and may be a more 
acceptable measure of interregional differences in social norms within a single country (e.g., Callen & 
Fang, 2015), our cross-country analysis of individualistic cultures has different implications than the 
studies resting on religion. “Religions are exceedingly complex institutions with protracted evolutionary 
tracks. Many accommodate the coexistence of conflicting views on numerous issues, and degree of 
religious commitment varies both within and across countries. Moreover, many modern countries are 
predominantly secular, thus weakening the direct link between religion and contemporary informal 
institutions. Finally, simply classifying countries by religion leaves the substantive content of the 
cultural differences virtually undefined” (Siegel, Licht, & Schwartz, 2011: 623–624). Our study links 
crash risk to individualistic cultures that shape managers’ beliefs and actions in the first place, thereby 
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providing the first convincing evidence of culture’s impact on crash risk. 
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the effects of individualistic cultures on stock 
price behaviors. The scarce literature in this area generally maintains that individualistic cultures are 
beneficial for stock investors as individualism enhances momentum trading profits (Chui, Titman, & 
Wei, 2010) and stock price informativeness (Eun, Wang, & Xiao, 2015). Our paper broadens this strand 
of studies by showing that individualistic cultures can lead to an adverse outcome in stock markets—
crashes. In this regard, our paper particularly extends the bad news hoarding theory of crash risk. 
Third, this paper offers new insights into the role of foreign investors in domestic stock markets. 
The financial consequence of introducing foreign capital into domestic stock markets is undergoing a 
continuing debate. For example, Bae, Chan, and Ng (2004) show that foreign-owned stocks, which are 
closely integrated with the global market, are vulnerable to international financial shocks. In contrast, 
Li, Nguyen, Pham, and Wei (2011) find that firms owned by large foreign investors have low stock 
return volatility. Our paper sheds additional light on this debate by showing that the impact of foreign 
capital on crash risk is dependent on the individualism distance between the home country of the foreign 
capital and its host country. This finding unveils a key undocumented feature: the role of foreign 
investors is decided by their cultural distance to the investee. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review and 
develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the model and data. Sections 4–6 present the empirical 
results. Section 7 concludes this paper. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Corporate managers, as insiders, have access to superior information regarding firms’ investments and 
operations. Managers’ commitment to prompt and accurate disclosure of inside information can improve 
information transparency and reduce the cost of capital (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Leuz & 
Verrecchia, 2000). However, to serve their own benefit, managers may exercise some discretion in 
timing the disclosure (Verrecchia, 2001). Kothari et al. (2009) show that managers, on average, withhold 
or delay bad news release. This bad news hoarding tendency arises for three main reasons. First, it can 
stem from managers’ career concerns. As managerial ability is largely assessed based on operating 
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outcomes, the release of bad news could prompt their quick dismissal or jeopardize their promotion 
prospects, while the withholding of bad news reduces such costs (Kothari et al., 2009). Second, if the 
revelation of bad news depresses the stock price, then managers have an incentive to hide such news, 
which, on being released, would result in wealth losses to their equity compensation (Benmelech, 
Kandel, & Veronesi, 2010; Kim, Li, & Zhang, 2011a). Third, as argued by Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal (2005) and Kothari et al. (2009), managers often delay bad news disclosure in the hope that 
firms’ real performance will improve soon, which then camouflages the unreleased bad news.  
Two types of bad news can be strategically withheld by managers, yielding crash risk. The first is 
bad news about firms’ earnings. Hutton et al. (2009) show that bad earnings news can be disguised 
through earnings manipulation, which engenders stock price crashes. Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011b) find 
that tax sheltering serves as a tool for managers to hide bad earnings news, thus elevating crash risk. 
The second type of bad news is unfavorable information about firms’ investments. Bleck and Liu (2007) 
argue that, under the historical cost accounting regime, which allows managers to conceal investments’ 
poor performance, bad investment projects would be kept alive for too long. When their inferior 
performance eventually surfaces, a stock price crash occurs. Furthermore, managers engaging in 
excessive risk taking tend to hide the true riskiness of the firm’s investments in order to alleviate 
investors’ concerns that the firm takes too much risk, which also increases crash risk (Kim et al., 2011a). 
The above agency theory-based literature assumes that managers always rationally evaluate the 
consequences of their decisions and accurately assess the intrinsic value of investments. But, to derive 
private benefit, they may deliberately hide unfavorable information at the expense of shareholders. In 
contrast, Kim, Wang, and Zhang (2016) argue that managers may not always hold unbiased beliefs and 
may sometimes make irrational inferences and decisions. Overconfident CEOs could (irrationally) 
perceive negative information about the firm’s investments as inaccurate and, hence, simply disregard 
or hide this ex post bad news, which allows these projects to survive for an extended period. Once the 
stockpiled adverse news materializes and breaks out, a stock price crash will occur. 
Most of the previous crash risk studies focus on a single market (e.g., the U.S.) and investigate 
how firm characteristics or actions affect crash risk (e.g., Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011a, 2011b). 
Extending these studies, we examine the cross-country differences in crash risk, and test whether these 
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differences are attributable to varied national culture. Recent literature on international business (IB) 
has witnessed a rapid growth of research topics on national culture and risky projects. Articles have 
documented that cultural distance affects international research and development (R&D) collaborations 
(Choi & Contractor, 2016) and cross-border venture capital syndication (Dai & Nahata, 2016). Boubakri, 
Guedhami, Kwok, and Saffar (2016) show that collectivism culture impacts the risk taking of privatized 
firms. Lisak, Erez, Sui, and Lee (2016) find that multicultural team leaders foster firm innovation. The 
retrospective articles by Beugelsdijk, Kostova, and Roth (2017), Devinney and Hohberger (2017), and 
Kirkman, Lowe, and Gibson (2017) synthesize the existing development in this field and inspire IB 
scholars to further advance the study of culture.  
The dominant cultural framework in IB research is arguably that of Hofstede, who defines national 
culture as the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes members of one country from 
another. Hofstede (2005) maintains that, within a country, individual members’ personal values may 
differ from the national cultural pattern but those who differ are fewer than those who conform to it, 
such that the national cultural values are shared by the majority of individuals. Among the four cultural 
dimensions in this framework (i.e., individualism, power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty 
avoidance), the individualism (versus collectivism) dimension appears to stand for the most significant 
cultural difference (Triandis, 2001). In countries oriented towards individualism (e.g., the U.S. and the 
U.K.), people on average hold more individualist values and fewer collectivist values (Hofstede, 2005). 
They are primarily individualists, who are loosely tied to each other. Their own interests more often take 
precedence over the interests of their in-group. By contrast, collectivism-oriented countries (e.g., China 
and Indonesia) form tightly knit social structures in which the group’s interests more likely prevail over 
those of the individual.  
To date, a large amount of literature has shown that the cultural dimension of individualism has a 
profound influence on various corporate decisions, such as dividend payouts (Shao, Kwok, & Guedhami, 
2010), corporate investment (Shao, Kwok, & Zhang, 2013), accounting discretion (Han et al., 2010), 
and corporate governance practices (Griffin, Guedhami, Kwok, Li, & Shao, 2017). The additional 
evidence on the relevance of individualism to stock price movements (e.g., Chui et al., 2010; Eun et al., 
2015) further points to the possibility that stock price crashes may relate to individualism. 
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We hypothesize that managers in a more individualistic country, on average, are more likely to 
hide bad news, leading to higher crash risk. There are several reasons for this hypothesis. First, managers 
in individualistic countries are especially concerned about bad news release. In Hofstede’s (2005) view, 
the relationship between employees and employers in individualistic countries is of a calculative 
contract type. Employers are not expected to care for their employees beyond the scope of the work 
contract. It is thus socially acceptable for employers to dismiss employees who are underperforming. 
However, in collectivistic countries, the corporation itself can be seen as an in-group where employees 
and employers comprise an “extended family.” The work relationship is composed of a moral 
commitment: employers protect their employees in exchange for loyalty. “Poor performance of an 
employee in this relationship is no reason for dismissal: one does not dismiss one’s child” (Hofstede, 
2005: 100). Relative to the board of directors and shareholders, managers are employees. Their poor 
performance in individualistic countries greatly increases the likelihood of their being replaced, giving 
a strong incentive for them to hide bad news (Kothari et al., 2009), thus generating crash risk. 
Moreover, Hofstede (2005) and Jackson and Schuler (1995) argue that individualistic societies 
prefer compensation practices that center on individual recognition, and tend to remunerate individuals 
for what they have contributed. Schuler and Rogovsky (1998) show that managerial compensation in 
individualistic countries is closely linked to firm performance, and that performance-based 
compensation plans such as bonuses and equity grants are prevalent. Such compensation structures 
create incentives for managers to hide bad news, as this behavior can sustain stock prices in the short 
term and consequently their equity wealth (Benmelech et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2011a).1 The hoarding 
of bad news further augments the likelihood of crashes in individualistic countries.2 
Second, managers in individualistic countries tend to enjoy high autonomy to make individual 
                                                          
1 John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) find that incorporating the incentive features of managerial compensation 
structures as inputs into Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation deposit insurance pricing can elicit optimal 
investment-risk choices by banks. Our (unreported) regression results based on a dynamic simultaneous equations 
model suggest that crash risk can be endogenized in the design of CEOs’ equity-based compensation to achieve 
desired outcomes. 
2 In addition, other corporate governance mechanisms may impact the link between individualism and crash risk. 
As John and Senbet (1998) suggest, one mechanism crucial to corporate governance effectiveness is board 
monitoring. Outside directors, who often play an effective role in monitoring and disciplining managers (e.g., 
Weisbach, 1988), primarily comprise the corporate boards in high individualism countries (Li & Harrison, 2008). 
A consequent intuitive expectation would be that these outside directors could constrain managerial bad news 
hoarding, thereby moderating the effect of individualism on crash risk. 
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decisions on bad news hoarding. According to Markus and Kitayama (1991), the independent self-
construal in individualistic cultures is characterized by an emphasis on autonomy and independence. As 
discovering and expressing one’s unique internal attributes is crucial in these cultures, people have a 
strong belief in individual choices and decisions (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Within firms, the 
independence focus fosters a considerable amount of individual judgment in decision making by 
managers (Gray, 1988), and they are endowed with high flexibility in terms of self-governance and 
professionalism (Han et al., 2010). Therefore, we expect that managers in individualistic countries are 
likely to make individual choices to hoard bad news, particularly when the hiding of bad news can 
protect their job and wealth, which ultimately results in stock price crashes.  
Finally, managers in high individualism countries tend to enhance their positive view of 
themselves by suppressing bad news. Markus and Kitayama (1991) argue that the motive to enhance a 
positive self-concept is strong in individualistic cultures, where expressing and affirming the self is vital, 
and is weak in collectivistic cultures, where fitting in with others is critical and enhancing oneself can 
harm interpersonal harmony and even single out the individual. As such, self-enhancement, which 
reflects people’s inclination to view their own traits, attitudes, and actions in the most positive light 
(Pfeffer & Fong, 2005), is more evident in individualistic cultures than collectivistic ones (Heine, 2003). 
When confronted with negative self-relevant information, people in individualistic cultures tend to 
behave in a way that restores their positive self-view (Heine, 2003). Thus, it is logical to expect that 
managers in individualistic countries are likely to withhold bad news that conflicts with their desire to 
perceive themselves as skilled and competent. 
In addition, the self-enhancement tendency in individualistic cultures has two consequent effects 
concerning bad news hoarding. First, managers in these cultures tend to think optimistically about the 
future (Fischer & Chalmers, 2008), believing that things will turn in their favor and improved future 
conditions can absorb at least some of the hidden bad news. Second, they are likely to overestimate their 
abilities (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). They tend to believe 
that they have chosen a subtle, clever approach to systematically disguising unfavorable information—
for example, by engaging in complex earnings manipulation or tax shelters—so that investors will not 
detect their misbehavior. Furthermore, the bad news is often deemed inaccurate by these overconfident 
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managers, who may simply ignore it, which also adds to crash risk (Kim et al., 2016). 
Taken together, we posit that, on average, managers in higher individualism countries are more 
likely to hide bad news, which then leads to higher crash risk. Our hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis (H1): Firms located in countries with higher levels of individualism have higher 
stock price crash risk. 
3. Model and data 
3.1. Crash risk measures 
To measure firm-specific crash risk, we first estimate the following expanded market model regression 
for each firm and year based on the model of Jin and Myers (2006): 
(1)          𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑖[𝑟𝑈.𝑆.,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑋𝑗,𝑡] + 𝛽3,𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4,𝑖[𝑟𝑈.𝑆.,𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝑋𝑗,𝑡−1]
+ 𝛽5,𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑗,𝑡−2 + 𝛽6,𝑖[𝑟𝑈.𝑆.,𝑡−2 + 𝐸𝑋𝑗,𝑡−2] + 𝛽7,𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑗,𝑡+1 + 𝛽8,𝑖[𝑟𝑈.𝑆.,𝑡+1 + 𝐸𝑋𝑗,𝑡+1]
+ 𝛽9,𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑗,𝑡+2 + 𝛽10,𝑖[𝑟𝑈.𝑆.,𝑡+2 + 𝐸𝑋𝑗,𝑡+2] + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the stock return for firm i in week t, 𝑟𝑚,𝑗,𝑡 is the local market return for country j in week t, 
𝑟𝑈.𝑆.,𝑡 is the U.S. market return in week t, and 𝐸𝑋𝑗,𝑡 is the change in country j’s exchange rate versus the 
U.S. dollar in week t. As the local firm’s stock return could be exposed to global market fluctuations, 
𝑟𝑈.𝑆.,𝑡+𝐸𝑋𝑗,𝑡 is included as a proxy for the global market return. We include two lead and two lag terms 
for both the local and global market returns to allow for non-synchronous trading (Dimson, 1979). The 
residual return, 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , is the stock return explained by neither the local nor the global market return 
variations and thus is related to firm-specific idiosyncratic factors. As the residual returns are positively 
skewed on average (Jin & Myers, 2006), we log-transform the returns, and compute the firm-specific 
weekly return (𝑊𝑖,𝑡) as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the residual return—that is, 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡).  
The first crash risk variable, NCSKEW, measures the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly 
returns, which denotes the degree of asymmetry in the distribution of stock returns. We compute 
NCSKEW by taking the negative of the third central moment of firm-specific weekly returns scaled by 
the sample variance of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the power of 3/2 (Chen, Hong, & Stein, 
2001). Specifically, NCSKEW is calculated as: 
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(2)                                        𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = −
𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
3
2 ∑ 𝑊𝑖,𝑡
3
(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)(∑ 𝑊𝑖,𝑡
2 )
3
2
  
where n is the number of firm i-specific weekly returns in year t. 
The second crash risk variable, DUVOL, measures the down-to-up volatility of firm-specific 
weekly returns, which denotes the degree of asymmetry in volatilities between negative and positive 
stock returns. DUVOL is calculated by taking the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation 
of firm-specific weekly returns in down weeks to the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns 
in up weeks (Chen et al., 2001). A firm-week is defined as a down (an up) week if the firm-specific 
weekly return is below (above) its annual mean. Specifically, DUVOL is calculated as: 
(3)                                            𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
(𝑛𝑢 − 1) ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑑,𝑡
2
(𝑛𝑑 − 1) ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑢,𝑡
2 ] 
where 𝑊𝑖𝑑,𝑡 (𝑊𝑖𝑢,𝑡) is the firm i-specific weekly return during a down (an up) week in year t, and 𝑛𝑑 
(𝑛𝑢) is the number of down (up) weeks for firm i in year t. 
The third crash risk variable, COUNT, is created based on the frequency of negative versus 
positive extreme firm-specific weekly returns. We define a firm-week as a crash (jump) week if the 
firm-specific weekly return is 3.09 standard deviations below (above) its annual mean, where 3.09 is 
chosen to generate a weekly crash (jump) frequency of 0.1% in the normal distribution (Hutton et al., 
2009). COUNT is computed as the number of crash weeks minus the number of jump weeks over a 
given year (Jin & Myers, 2006). 
In sum, a higher value of NCSKEW, DUVOL, or COUNT signifies a higher level of crash risk. 
3.2. Baseline regression model 
We examine the impact of individualism on crash risk using the following regression model: 
(4)                              𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑗 + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊𝒋,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝒀𝒋,𝒕 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗,𝑡+1  
where country is indexed by j, firm by i, and year by t; CrashRisk denotes one of the crash risk variables 
NCSKEW, DUVOL, and COUNT; and IDV is Hofstede’s individualism index. 
X denotes a set of firm-level control variables that have been documented to influence crash risk 
(e.g., Kim et al., 2011a, 2011b). NCSKEW_LAG is included to account for the persistence of crash risk 
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over time. Since the dependent variable, NCSKEW, is the third moment of firm-specific weekly returns, 
we control for the first and second moments: the mean (RET) and standard deviation (SIGMA) of firm-
specific weekly returns. Detrended stock turnover (DTURN) is included as a proxy for the intensity of 
investor disagreement about the stock’s fundamentals. Earnings opacity (ACCM) is calculated by taking 
the moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals over the previous three years, where 
discretionary accruals are computed using the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 
1995). Following the convention in the literature, we control for a range of firm characteristics, including 
financial leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA), market-to-book ratio (MTB), and firm size (SIZE).  
Y denotes a set of country-level control variables. As Hofstede (2005) documents that 
individualism is strongly correlated with national wealth, we control for GDP per capita (GDP/CAPITA). 
We also control for GDP growth (GDP_GROWTH) to isolate the effect of economic growth. Stock 
market capitalization (MCAP) and stock market turnover (STKTURN) are included as measures of stock 
market development. As Li, Griffin, Yue, and Zhao (2013) argue that individualistic countries tend to 
build strong formal institutions to protect creditors’ rights, we control for the index of creditor rights 
(CR) to separate its impact on crash risk.3 Variable definitions are summarized in the Appendix. 
In addition, industry dummies (based on 3-digit Industry Classification Benchmark code) and year 
dummies are included to account for industry-wide and yearly fluctuations in crash risk, respectively. 
Equation (4) is then estimated by using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with robust standard 
errors corrected for firm-level clustering (Petersen, 2009). If the coefficient estimate (β1) of IDV is 
positive and significant, then the hypothesis H1 is supported. That is, firms in more individualistic 
countries have higher crash risk. 
3.3. Sample 
We start with all publicly listed firms worldwide covered by Datastream. We calculate the weekly stock 
return (Ret) using Datastream total return index (mnemonic: RI), a stock price index adjusted for stock 
                                                          
3 We do not control for anti-director rights, because we find that the effect of creditor rights on crash risk subsumes 
that of anti-director rights, and that adding a control for anti-director rights can result in severe multicollinearity 
problems, leading to spurious results on anti-director rights. Nevertheless, the relation between individualism and 
crash risk is unaffected by adding this additional control variable. 
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splits and dividends. We follow Ince and Porter (2006) in screening and correcting for coding errors in 
RI. Specifically, we set an RI as missing if it is less than 0.01, as Datastream rounding RI to the nearest 
tenth can overstate the fraction of zero returns; and we drop an RI if Ret exceeds 200% and reverses 
within one week. We truncate the absolute value of Ret at 0.5 for unusual large returns. Our additional 
data sources include Hofstede (2005) for the individualism index, Worldscope for firm-level financial 
statement data, and World Development Indicators and existing literature for country-level data. 
We apply the following filters to the sample: (1) we exclude American Depository Receipts and 
Global Depository Receipts because these stocks traded outside their home country could be affected 
by the host country’s governance rules, political risks, and even cultures, which may distort our results; 
(2) we exclude utility firms because they are heavily regulated by governments and largely monopolistic; 
(3) we exclude financial firms because their normally high leverage often reflects financial distress for 
other firms;4 (4) we require at least 26 weekly stock returns available in a year to avoid any distortions 
associated with the stock’s initial public offering, delisting, or long-term trading suspension; (5) we 
require the sample with non-missing data for all variables in Equation (4); and (6) we exclude countries 
with fewer than 100 firm-year observations over the entire sample period. Finally, we are left with a 
sample of 26,473 firms from 42 countries spanning the period 1990–2013. 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the sample distribution. The individualism scores range from 0.14 for 
Indonesia and Pakistan, the least individualistic countries, to 0.91 for the U.S., the most individualistic 
country. In Column 4, we define a firm as a crashed firm if it experienced at least one crash week over 
the sample period. We find that a country with a higher score of individualism is likely associated with 
a higher percentage of crashed firms. Panel B of Table 1 presents the sample distribution of crashed 
firms by year. We observe that 17.08% of firms crashed in 2008, which coincided with the peak of the 
recent global financial crisis.  
< Insert Table 1 > 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the summary statistics of firm- and country-level variables. The mean 
values of NCSKEW, DUVOL, and COUNT are –0.155, –0.091, and –0.077, respectively. Panel B of 
                                                          
4 Our main finding remains the same if the American Depository Receipts, Global Depository Receipts, utility 
firms, and financial firms are added back to the sample. 
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Table 2 reports the univariate tests of the crash risk variables in high versus low individualism countries. 
We classify a country-year into the High (Low) IDV group if the country’s individualism score is above 
(below) the cross-country sample median in the year. We find that the firm-level crash risk in High IDV 
countries is, on average, significantly higher than that in Low IDV countries. Note that the firm-level 
univariate test results could suffer from the countries’ disproportionate representation in the firm-year 
sample. We compute value-weighted country average crash risk for each year and repeat the univariate 
analysis at the aggregate country level. High IDV countries report significantly higher mean and median 
values of crash risk than Low IDV countries.  
< Insert Table 2 > 
Figure 1 plots each country’s value-weighted average crash risk against the country’s 
individualism score. All fitted trend lines are upward sloping, implying a positive link between 
individualism and crash risk. 
< Insert Figure 1 > 
4. Individualism and crash risk 
4.1. Baseline regression results 
In Table 3, we present the baseline OLS regression results for the impact of individualism on crash risk. 
The coefficient estimates (t-statistics) of IDV are equal to 0.148 (15.69), 0.071 (15.70), and 0.096 (13.69) 
in Columns 1–3, respectively. The results suggest a positive and significant effect of individualism on 
crash risk, lending support to hypothesis H1 that firms in more individualistic countries are more prone 
to stock price crashes. 
< Insert Table 3 > 
For the firm-level control variables, we find that NCSKEW_LAG is positively related to future 
crash risk, indicating that crash risk tends to persist over time (Chen et al., 2001). SIGMA significantly 
increases crash risk, in line with the notion that high risk-taking firms are likely to crash (Callen & Fang, 
2015). We document positive and significant coefficients on ACCM, consistent with Hutton et al. (2009), 
who show that firms with higher levels of earnings management display higher crash risk. DTURN is 
positively related to crash risk, consistent with the finding of Chen et al. (2001) that stocks are more 
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crash prone when there are greater differences of investors’ opinion about the stock fundamentals. The 
coefficients on MTB and SIZE are significantly positive, indicating that high-growth stocks and large-
cap stocks have high crash risk, consistent with the results of Kim et al. (2011b).  
For the country-level control variables, we find that GDP/CAPITA and GDP_GROWTH are 
positively and significantly related to crash risk, which reflects the high firm-level crash risk in wealthy 
countries and high-growth countries. STKTURN is positively related to crash risk, indicating that firms 
listed in stock markets with higher turnover ratios exhibit higher crash risk. CR has a negative impact 
on crash risk, which reveals the beneficial role of creditor protection in mitigating crash risk. 
The adjusted R2 values range from 0.021 to 0.042, comparable in magnitude to the results of Kim 
et al. (2011a) and DeFond et al. (2014) on studies of crash risk. Crash risk regressions tend to produce 
low R2 because crash risk variables are derived from firm-specific stock returns, which contain noisy, 
firm-specific information. 
4.2. Endogeneity 
To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we first estimate two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions by 
employing two instrumental variables (IVs) for individualism: (1) the country’s genetic distance to the 
U.S., denoted Genetic_Distance, retrieved from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009); and (2) the country’s 
grammatical rule on pronoun drop, Pronoun_Drop, which equals 1 if the major language spoken in the 
country licenses pronoun drop and 0 otherwise, collected from Kashima and Kashima (1998). In Table 
4, the first-stage regression results show that Genetic_Distance is negatively and significantly related to 
IDV, in line with the notion that a country that is more genetically distant from the U.S. is more culturally 
distant from the U.S.—that is, less individualistic. Pronoun_Drop is negatively and significantly related 
to IDV, which upholds Kashima and Kashima’s (1998) viewpoint that people who speak a pronoun-
drop language are less highlighted from the context of speech and naturally become less individualistic. 
In the second-stage regressions, 𝐼𝐷𝑉 ̂ significantly increases crash risk, which supports our hypothesis 
that firms in more individualistic countries are more crash prone. 
< Insert Table 4 > 
In addition, we rerun the baseline OLS regressions by including additional country-level control 
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variables, and report the results in Online Appendix Table A1.  
First, as religion and culture interact closely in their development,5 we control for the country’s 
predominant religion as proxied by Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodox, Islam, and Buddhism 
dummies collected from the World Factbook. The omitted dummy refers to the countries with a 
predominant religion of Hinduism or Judaism, or modern secular countries. We show that, compared to 
stocks listed in these omitted countries, those listed in Catholic and Protestant countries have low crash 
risk.  
Second, as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) find that legal origins 
influence the development of modern legal systems, which in turn could affect crash risk, we control for 
the country’s legal origin by including English common law (English), French civil law (French), 
German civil law (German), and Scandinavian civil law (Scandinavian) dummies collected from 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003). The omitted dummy is the one for countries 
with a socialist legal origin (i.e., China, Poland, and Russia in our sample). We show that firms in 
countries with a French civil law origin have lower crash risk than those in countries with a socialist 
legal origin.  
Third, as Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz (2007) show that individualistic countries tend to 
establish strong governance institutions, we control for the country’s governance quality (Governance). 
The variable is constructed as the first factor of the factor analysis of the six indexes created by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) for assessing each country’s governance quality in aspects of 
(1) voice and accountability, (2) political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, (3) government 
effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law, and (6) control of corruption. The results show that 
firms in better-governed countries are less likely to crash. 
Finally, as individualistic countries place more emphasis on individual freedom and thus are less 
likely to impose limit rules on individual stocks’ daily price variation,6 we control for the dummy 
indicator of the presence of daily price limit rules on the country’s major stock exchanges (Price_Limit), 
                                                          
5 For example, Protestant countries tend to be more individualistic than Catholic countries (Hofstede, 2001). 
6 The U.S. and the U.K. do not have daily stock price limit rules, while China, Indonesia, and Pakistan have such 
rules. 
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which is collected from Deb, Kalev, and Marisetty (2010) and stock exchange websites. We find that 
the price limit rules can curb crash risk. 
When these additional controls are incorporated into the baseline OLS regressions, the positive 
relation between individualism and crash risk continues to hold. 
4.3. Robustness checks 
We conduct a variety of robustness tests and find our results largely unchanged.7  
4.3.1. Alternative indexes of individualism 
The cultural dimension of individualism is not only a product of Hofstede’s work but also is prevalent 
in other conceptual cultural studies. To compare the regression results across different individualism 
indexes, we rescale each of the indexes to be between 0 and 1 (with the minimum score recoded as 0 
and the maximum score recoded as 1), and rerun the baseline regressions using the rescaled indexes 
from Hofstede as well as the following cultural frameworks. 
First, we employ the bipolar dimensions of autonomy versus embeddedness from Schwartz (1994, 
2004). For autonomy, there are two types of constructs: (1) intellectual autonomy, which reflects the 
independent pursuit of individuals’ own ideas and intellectual directions; and (2) affective autonomy, 
which reflects the independent pursuit of individuals’ positive affective experiences for themselves. At 
the opposite pole, embeddedness refers to individuals being integrated into the large collectivity. To 
measure individualism, we multiply the embeddedness score by –1, labeled opposite embeddedness. In 
Online Appendix Table A2, we show that only affective autonomy is positively and significantly related 
to crash risk, whereas the effects of intellectual autonomy and opposite embeddedness are either negative 
or insignificant.8 
                                                          
7 In addition, we re-estimate Equation (4) by using weighted-least-squares regressions, Fama-MacBeth estimation 
procedure, adjusting firm-level variables by their within-country medians, hierarchical linear modeling, and 
altering the cluster specifications of heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Our main finding still holds. See 
Online Appendix Note A1 and Table A5 Panel D for details of these tests. 
8 The inconsistent results could be driven by Schwartz’s ordering of the U.S. on the individualism dimension. 
Schwartz (1994, 2004) highlights that the U.S., viewed by Hofstede as the most individualistic country, ranks only 
30th on the autonomy dimension of his own framework. Since U.S. firms dominate our sample, and the country’s 
individualism ranking differs greatly across the two frameworks, we exclude the U.S. from the sample. Online 
Appendix Table A3 shows that, in the non-U.S. sample, affective and intellectual autonomy and opposite 
embeddedness indexes are all positively and significantly associated with crash risk. 
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Second, we use the indexes developed by House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta (2004) 
in the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) project. As the GLOBE’s 
survey respondents are all managers, the indexes could be a more precise measurement of managerial 
cultural attributes. As opposed to individualism, GLOBE distinguishes two forms of collectivism: (1) 
institutional collectivism, which assesses the degree to which institutional practices at the societal level 
encourage and reward collective action; and (2) in-group collectivism, which assesses the degree to 
which individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their families. For both dimensions, 
GLOBE separates the scales of societal values (“should be”) and practices (“as is”). We multiply 
GLOBE’s collectivism scores by –1 (the constructed variables prefixed by opposite) to represent the 
level of individualism. The results in Online Appendix Table A2 show that crash risk is significantly 
positively associated with opposite institutional collectivism values and opposite in-group collectivism 
practices, while its relations with opposite institutional collectivism practices and opposite in-group 
collectivism values are inconsistent with our expectation.9 
Third, we use an individualism index derived from the World Values Survey (WVS). Following 
Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2015), we focus on the WVS respondents’ answers to the question: 
“How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement that 
incomes should be made more equal; 10 means you agree completely with the statement that we need 
larger income differences as incentives for individual effort; and if your views fall somewhere in 
between, you can choose any number (1–9) in between.” A country that places more emphasis on 
encouraging individual effort tends to be more individualistic. We rescale each respondent’s answer 
score to fit a range 0–1 and then take the average response score from each country-year to be the 
country’s score of individualism in the surveyed year. Since the surveys were completed in 
nonconsecutive waves, we assign the most recent available individualism score calculated from the 
WVS to each country-year in our sample. Using this time-varying index, we control further for country-
                                                          
9 The inconsistent results could be due to GLOBE’s separate assessment of societal values and practices. Hofstede 
(2006) argues that GLOBE survey respondents tended to describe their existing practices in comparison to the 
desirable values in the society. That is, the constructs of societal values and societal practices may not be truly 
independent. Hence, we use factor analysis and extract the first factor of the two scales to uncover each country’s 
cultural pattern underlying individuals’ values and practices. Online Appendix Table A4 shows that the 
individualism factor scores constructed from GLOBE’s indexes significantly increase crash risk. 
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fixed effects that capture all time-invariant country-level heterogeneity. As shown in Online Appendix 
Table A2, the relation between individualism and crash risk still holds.  
Finally, to minimize measurement errors and make a more compelling case for what is measured 
in these different cultural constructs, we apply factor analysis to all the individualism indexes of 
Hofstede, Schwartz, GLOBE, and WVS, and take the first factor as the individualism measure. As 
reported in Online Appendix Table A2, our finding remains the same.  
4.3.2. Alternative market models to derive firm-specific stock returns 
We adopt two alternative market models to estimate the firm-specific stock returns. In the single market 
model, we assume that the local firm’s stock returns are unaffected by the global market, and thus we 
only include the two lead and two lag terms for the local market returns in the model. Alternatively, in 
the world market model, we assume that the local firm’s stock returns are subject to both the local and 
global market-wide return variations, but substitute the world market index return (Datastream 
mnemonic: TOTMKWD) for 𝑟𝑈.𝑆.,𝑡+𝐸𝑋𝑗,𝑡 in Equation (1). We take the residual returns derived from 
these two alternative market model regressions to compute crash risk, SIGMA, and RET, which then 
enter the regressions of Equation (4). We find qualitatively unchanged results as tabulated in Panel A of 
Online Appendix Table A5.  
4.3.3. Orthogonalization of individualism against GDP per capita 
The accumulation of national wealth can cultivate individualistic national culture (Hofstede, 2005). In 
our sample, individualism correlates highly with GDP per capita, with a correlation coefficient equal to 
0.50. To overcome any problems associated with the two variables’ high correlation, we orthogonalize 
individualism against GDP per capita by regressing each country’s individualism score on the country’s 
average GDP per capita over the sample period. The residual from this regression is used as a substitute 
for IDV in Equation (4). As shown in Panel B of Online Appendix Table A5, our finding remains valid. 
4.3.4. Alternative samples 
We rerun the baseline OLS regressions using alternative samples. First, to alleviate the concern that 
certain dominant countries in the firm-year sample may distort the results, we exclude the U.S. (and 
Japan) from the sample. Second, to reduce the undue effect of firm-level heterogeneity, we use balanced 
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panels. We require firms to be continuously listed on stock exchanges during 2004–2013, where the 
regressions control for the dummy indicator of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis period. To rule out 
the possibility that the effect of individualism on crash risk may be driven by the extreme financial 
market turbulence during the global financial crisis, we examine two separate balanced panels for the 
periods 2004–2007 and 2010–2013. The results reported in Panel C of Online Appendix Table A5 
support our main conclusion. 
5. Hofstede’s other cultural dimensions and crash risk 
Kirkman, Lowe, and Gibson (2006) recommend that research in international business should go beyond 
the single dimension of individualism. The analyses of Hofstede’s other cultural dimensions—namely, 
power distance (PDI), masculinity (MAS), and uncertainty avoidance (UAI)—would yield valuable 
insights. In this section, we examine the impact of these other cultural dimensions on crash risk. 
Power distance describes cultural conceptions regarding the acceptance of power inequality 
between subordinates and superiors. In high PDI countries, the subordinate–superior relationships are 
strongly hierarchical and existentially unequal (Hofstede, 2005). Superiors hold great amounts of power 
and authority over subordinates. Contradicting the superiors can lead to severe reprimands and 
punishment. Subordinates are thus frequently afraid of disobeying their superiors, and often work hard 
to identify and serve their superiors’ needs (Mead & Andrews, 2009). In the business context, managers, 
as subordinates to the board of directors and even external regulators, likely embrace this power 
inequality and make themselves submissive to these superiors. Consequently, bad news hoarding, which 
is discouraged by their superiors, would be avoided by managers in high PDI countries, thereby reducing 
crash risk. 
Masculinity assesses the extent to which emotional gender roles are divided between men and 
women. According to Hofstede (2005), in masculine countries, men are supposed to be assertive, tough, 
and focused on material success, while women are supposed to be modest, tender, and caring about the 
quality of life. In contrast, the emotional gender roles tend to overlap in feminine countries, where both 
men and women are expected to be modest, tender, and caring about the quality of life. As top 
management is predominantly men (Dezsö & Ross, 2012), cultural values such as preferences for 
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assertiveness and material success would prevail among managers in masculine countries. As such, these 
managers could be more concerned about the damage to their career prospects and compensation that is 
potentially induced by bad news release. Therefore, we expect that managers in higher MAS countries 
have a stronger motivation to withhold bad news, leading to higher crash risk. 
Uncertainty avoidance reflects the degree to which people in a society feel anxious and stressed 
about uncertainty or ambiguity. Although the establishment of formal rules and laws can defend against 
uncertainty in people’s behavior, the defense does not create absolute certainty in an objective sense. 
We expect that managers in high UAI countries tend to feel anxious in the face of uncertain outcomes 
of bad news hoarding. To minimize uncertainty and ease anxiety, they would refrain from withholding 
bad news. In the case of hiding bad news about excessive risk taking in investments, in particular, 
managers in higher UAI countries take less risk in general (Li et al., 2013), making such hiding less 
necessary. Therefore, firms in higher UAI countries would be less prone to crashes.  
In Table 5, we estimate the effects of these cultural dimensions on crash risk using both firm- and 
country-level regressions. The country-level estimation mitigates the concern about particular countries’ 
overrepresentation in the firm-year sample, and generates appropriate coefficient estimates for 
measuring the economic significance of the effects of country-level cultural variables on firm-level crash 
risk. To form the country-level measures, we aggregate each firm-level variable to its value-weighted 
country average for each sample year.  
< Insert Table 5 > 
The regression results in Panels A and B of Table 5 show that crash risk is negatively associated 
with PDI and UAI, but positively associated with MAS. When we incorporate all four cultural 
dimensions into the regressions, the key variable of interest, IDV, has a significantly positive effect on 
all three crash risk variables. This result suggests that our finding for individualism does not simply 
capture the effects of Hofstede’s other cultural dimensions.  
Kirkman et al. (2017) and Beugelsdijk et al. (2017) urge IB researchers to further assess the effect 
size of national culture. Following their suggestion, we estimate and present the four cultural variables’ 
economic significance in Panel C of Table 5, based on the country-level regression coefficients reported 
in Columns 10–12 of Panel B. We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in IDV (from half a 
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standard deviation below the mean to half a standard deviation above it, which is approximately from 
the level of individualism in Russia to that in Finland) increases NCSKEW by 22.23% from its sample 
mean.10  An increase in IDV from the minimum to the maximum (from the level of individualism in 
Pakistan to that in the U.S.) increases NCSKEW by 69.01%. By comparison, a one-standard-deviation 
increase in MAS (approximately from the level of masculinity in South Korea to that in New Zealand) 
leads to a 15.21% increase in NCSKEW. An increase in MAS from the minimum to the maximum (from 
the level of masculinity in Sweden to that in Japan) leads to a 68.77% increase in NCSKEW.  
Taken together, several findings emerge. First, the significant and positive relation between 
individualism and crash risk remains valid in the country-level regressions. Second, the impact of 
individualism is statistically significant after Hofstede’s other cultural dimensions are included. Third, 
the impact of individualism is economically large compared to the other cultural dimensions. These 
findings corroborate Triandis (2001), who argues for the dominant role of individualism among different 
cultural dimensions. Therefore, in the following sections, we focus on the individualism dimension to 
shed more light on the culture’s impact on crash risk. 
6. Additional analyses 
6.1. The role of foreign investors in transmitting individualism from overseas 
Does individualism only stem from domestic national culture? The recent literature has found evidence 
that foreign investors can diffuse their home-country cultures, such as cultural norms about corruption 
(DeBacker, Heim, & Tran, 2015) and transparency (Braguinsky & Mityakov, 2015), to host-country 
recipient firms through socialization. One expectation in our setting is that foreign investors may carry 
individualism cultures from their home country to the local firms in the host country. The individualistic 
values of foreign investors would then be socialized into the host-country managers’ attitudes and 
actions towards individualism, which consequently affects the local managers’ bad news hoarding 
tendency and the firms’ crash risk. 
                                                          
10 The magnitude of the economic significance is calculated as (0.095×0.248)/0.106=22.23%, where 0.095 is the 
coefficient of IDV in Column 10 of Panel B of Table 5, 0.248 is the standard deviation of IDV in the country-year 
sample, and 0.106 is the absolute value of the mean NCSKEW in the country-year sample. 
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Empirically, if individualism can be transmitted by foreign investors from overseas markets, we 
should observe a significant effect of the transmitted individualism on the crash risk of host-country 
recipient firms. We collect firm-level foreign institutional ownership data from the FactSet database,11 
and assess the level of transmitted individualism by calculating the weighted sum of the signed algebraic 
difference in individualism scores between the home country of the foreign institutional investors and 
the host country. Specifically, the firm-level yearly transmitted individualism measure is constructed as 
follows: 
(5)      𝐼𝐷𝑉 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑗 =  ∑(𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖,𝑛,𝑘 − 𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖,𝑗)  ×
𝑛
 𝑤𝑖,𝑛 
where i indexes the firm, n indexes the foreign institutional investor who invests in the firm, j indexes 
the country of domicile of the firm, k indexes the country of residence of the foreign institutional investor, 
and w is the proportion of shares held by the foreign institutional investor. A positive (negative) value 
indicates that the firm’s foreign institutional investors as a whole come from an individualistic (a 
collectivistic) country relative to the host country.  
We augment the right-hand side of Equation (4) with the IDV difference due to foreign 
institutional investors variable. Columns 1−3 of Table 6 show that this variable is positively and 
significantly related to crash risk, which suggests that the capital inflow from a foreign country whose 
individualism score is higher (lower) than that of the host country increases (decreases) the crash risk 
of the host-country recipient firm. 
< Insert Table 6 > 
Foreign ownership, while shaping domestic cultures, can integrate domestic stocks with the global 
market, rendering the stocks vulnerable to global market shocks (Bae et al., 2004). We therefore control 
for the domestic stocks’ price responsiveness to global market fluctuations by including two alternative 
additional control variables: Delay 1 to global information and Delay 2 to global information, which 
quantify the delay with which an individual stock’s price return adjusts to the global market portfolio 
return variation, constructed following Hou and Moskowitz (2005) and McQueen, Pinegar, and Thorley 
(1996), respectively. A domestic stock whose price reacts more slowly to global market information 
                                                          
11 The foreign ownership data exist in the FactSet database from 1999 onwards. 
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would be less vulnerable to global market shocks and, hence, less likely to crash. Columns 4−9 of Table 
6 show that our results continue to hold when the price delay is added as a control, and that the price 
delay reduces crash risk. Overall, our findings espouse the idea that the individualism transmitted by 
foreign investors from overseas has an influence on domestic stocks’ crash risk. 
6.2. Individualism, firm risk taking, and earnings management 
The crash-relevant managerial bad news hoarding can arise from firm risk taking (Callen & Fang, 2015) 
and earnings management (Hutton et al., 2009). As managers in more individualistic countries generally 
have more freedom to make risky investment decisions and to adopt their individual accounting choices 
(Han et al., 2010; Li et al., 2013), we expect that individualism, as a cultural institution, can motivate 
managers to engage in these bad-news-hoarding-related opportunistic behaviors, which in turn heighten 
crash risk. To test for this prediction, we examine how individualism, risk taking, and earnings 
management interact with each other to affect crash risk.  
In Panel A of Table 7, the positive coefficients on IDV×SIGMA indicate that risk taking has a 
larger increasing impact on crash risk in more individualistic countries.12 In Panel B, the positive 
coefficients on IDV×ACCM suggest that firms that manipulate reported earnings suffer higher crash risk 
in more individualistic countries. These results reveal that individualism exacerbates the link of crash 
risk with risk taking and earnings management when these two managerial behaviors occur separately. 
In Panel C, the negative coefficients on the three-way interaction of IDV, SIGMA, and ACCM suggest 
that the two interaction effects, IDV×SIGMA and IDV×ACCM, offset each other when taking place 
together.  
< Insert Table 7 >  
It is also noteworthy that the coefficients on the single IDV variable in Panel C of Table 7 are 
significantly positive, indicating that individualism increases crash risk even in the absence of firm risk 
taking and earnings management. This finding strengthens the argument that individualism has a direct 
impact on crash risk by aggravating bad news hoarding by managers, necessitating our study of the 
                                                          
12 Our unreported results further show that Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance index moderates the effect of risk 
taking on crash risk. 
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independent role of individualism in stock price crashes. 
6.3. Individualism and country-level financial information transparency  
The extent to which individualism affects crash risk could vary across countries. As Jin and Myers (2006) 
document, improved country-level financial information transparency can dampen managers’ ability to 
hoard bad news, thereby reducing crash risk. We thus expect that transparent information environments 
can curb the heightened managerial bad news hoarding in high individualism countries. If this is the 
case, empirically we should observe that the positive relation between individualism and crash risk is 
attenuated by enhanced country-level financial information transparency.  
To quantify the degree of country-level financial information transparency, we employ the 
financial transparency index (Financial Transparency) and the prevalence of disclosure index 
(Prevalence of Disclosure) from Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004). These indexes capture cross-
country differences in the intensity and timeliness of firm-specific financial information disclosure to 
investors. In addition, an advanced economy is usually considered to be transparent in financial 
information disclosure by firms. The Advanced Economy dummy is thus created, denoting the country’s 
advanced economy status as evaluated by the International Monetary Fund.  
We include each transparency measure alternatively in Equation (4) as an additional control 
variable, and then examine the effect of individualism on crash risk by allowing the coefficient to vary 
across high and low financial information transparency countries. For Financial Transparency and 
Prevalence of Disclosure, we create the dummy indicator High (Low), which equals 1 if the country’s 
transparency score is above (below) the cross-country sample median in a given year, and 0 otherwise.13 
For Advanced Economy, Yes (No) equals 1 if the country is (not) an advanced economy, and 0 otherwise.  
In Table 8, we assess the effect of country-level financial information transparency by carrying 
out a t-test on the coefficient difference between the two interaction terms. We observe that the positive 
association between individualism and crash risk consistently holds in both groups of countries, 
irrespective of the transparency measure used. However, the effect of individualism on crash risk is of 
                                                          
13  Both individualism and country-level financial information transparency proxies are country-level time-
invariant variables. Using their multiplication to estimate an interaction effect in such a large firm-year sample 
could cause severe collinearity between the two variables and their multiplication, yielding misleading results. 
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lower magnitude in high transparency countries than in low transparency ones, as reflected by a 
significant t-statistic on the coefficient difference. This evidence supports our prediction that improved 
country-level financial information transparency weakens the impact of individualism on crash risk. 
< Insert Table 8 > 
6.4. Individualism and crash risk within the U.S.  
6.4.1. Region-level individualism and crash risk 
Our baseline cross-country regression results face a challenge of omitted variable bias regarding 
country-level regressors. The analysis for a single country, without the necessity to consider cross-
country institutional differences, enables us to circumvent this endogeneity issue.  
Focusing solely on U.S. firms, we examine how the individualism scores across 10 census 
geographic regions as reported by the World Values Survey (e.g., East North Central, West North 
Central, Pacific, and so on) relate to the crash risk of firms headquartered in that region. As all the stocks 
trade in the same country, we remove the country-level control variables of stock market capitalization 
(MCAP), stock market turnover (STKTURN), and creditor rights (CR) from the baseline model. Given 
the strong link between individualism and societal wealth, we control for economic development levels 
and growth potentials across the U.S. states by including state-level GDP per capita (GDP/CAPITA) and 
GDP growth (GDP_GROWTH).14 In addition, we control for RELIGIOSITY, which equals the number 
of religious adherents divided by the total population in the county where the firm is headquartered, 
using data collected from the Association of Religion Data Archives, following Callen and Fang (2015). 
We regress firm-level crash risk on the rescaled WVS region-level individualism index (bounded 
between 0 and 1) and present the results in Table 9. We find that individualism has a significantly 
positive effect on crash risk even when the county-level religiosity is being controlled for. Note that the 
coefficients of IDV in the within-U.S. regressions are of lower magnitude and statistical significance 
                                                          
14 We extract the state-level GDP per capita and GDP growth data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
The BEA states: “There is a discontinuity in the GDP-by-state time series at 1997 […] This data discontinuity may 
affect both the levels and the growth rates of GDP by state. Users of GDP by state are strongly cautioned against 
appending the two data series in an attempt to construct a single time series for 1963 to 2013” 
(https://www.bea.gov/regional/docs/product/). Thus, including these state-level variables restricts the sample 
period to 1997–2013. 
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than those reported in the cross-country regressions. This is not surprising, as the interregional 
individualism differences within the U.S. are smaller than the individualism differences across countries 
(Ahern et al., 2015).  
< Insert Table 9 > 
6.4.2. Individualism, bad news hoarding, and stock price crashes 
The rationale for theorizing a positive effect of individualism on crash risk is that we predict that 
individualism propels managers to conceal and stockpile bad news up to a critical point at which the 
hidden bad news suddenly comes out, causing a stock price crash. But, does the link between 
individualism and crash risk really hinge on the withholding of bad news by managers? We test for this 
underlying mechanism by employing an accounting misreporting scenario.  
To ensure that stock price crashes are a consequence of bad news hoarding by managers, we study 
U.S. firms that restate accounting numbers and experience a stock price crash as a result. Material 
misreporting, which typically aims to hide bad news, often connects ultimately to accounting 
restatements. Take the Enron scandal as an example. To meet Wall Street’s expectations, Enron’s 
management adopted a mark-to-market accounting method to inflate earnings and used hundreds of 
special purpose entities to hide its huge debt. As a result, the company’s financial statements became 
too complex for analysts to understand. The analysts became suspicious of the accuracy of the 
company’s financial reports, while the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission started to investigate 
the company’s business transactions. Finally, on November 8, 2001, Enron had to correct its financial 
statements by restating its accounting numbers for the prior four years: earnings decreased by $591 
million and debt increased by $658 million. Enron’s stock price declined by 7.1% in a single day. It is 
obvious that when bad news can no longer be concealed, managers typically announce an accounting 
restatement to unveil the previously undisclosed poor financial information, leading to a stock price 
crash. 
We collect accounting restatement data from the Audit Analytics database. We identify a total of 
3,257 accounting restatements issued by our sample U.S. firms, spanning the period 1995–2013. We 
calculate firm-specific daily returns for the restatement firms, and define a crash event if the firm-
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specific daily return is 3.09 standard deviations below its annual mean. Out of the 3,257 total 
restatements, 296 restatements resulted in at least one crash over the restatement announcement window 
(0, +3)—that is, from the announcement date to the three following days. Each of the restatement firms 
with a subsequent crash (i.e., treatment firm) is then matched with a control firm. We require that the 
control firm (1) issued a restatement in the same year but did not suffer a crash, (2) was in the same 
industry, (3) had the closest total assets to the treatment firm, and (4) did not differ from the treatment 
firm in total assets by more than absolute 30%. These criteria yield a sample of 161 matched pairs 
between treatment and control firms. 
In Table 10, we compare treatment firms and control firms. We observe that neither the mean nor 
the median of firm-specific daily returns from day –3 to day –1 prior to the restatement announcement 
is significantly different across the two groups of firms. This result suggests that the pool of treatment 
firms is not a result of selecting certain firms that are inherently more crash prone, justifying the validity 
of our matching approach.  
< Insert Table 10 > 
Once the restatement is announced, the mean firm-specific daily return from day 0 to day +3 is 
−6.87% in treatment firms, which is significantly more negative than the mean return of −0.23% in 
control firms. The restatements made by treatment firms are associated with an average drop in net 
income by −2.64% of total assets, which is significantly more negative than −1.35% in control firms. 
The univariate tests on the medians lead to similar conclusions. These results suggest that, compared to 
control firms, restatement firms that suffer a subsequent crash are likely to have concealed material 
income-reducing news from investors.  
We assign the rescaled WVS region-level individualism scores to restatement firms based on their 
headquarters location. We compute the mean and median individualism scores for both the treatment 
and control groups of restatement firms. We show that treatment firms, on average, come from more 
individualistic regions than control firms. Collectively, our results suggest that managers in higher 
individualism regions are more likely to conceal firm-specific bad news from investors by overstating 
accounting numbers. The adverse news is being accumulated until the accounting misreporting has to 
be corrected through restatements, triggering stock price crashes. 
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6.5. Global financial crisis and IFRS adoption  
6.5.1. Global financial crisis 
In the recent global financial crisis, stock prices in major markets plunged about 50–70%. The crisis 
provides a natural laboratory for exploring how severe market financial constraints affect the relation 
between individualism and crash risk. As liquidity dried up quickly during the crisis (Lang, Lins, & 
Maffett, 2012), firms would find it difficult to sustain their bad news hoarding practice because they 
became more financially constrained and thus less able to disguise their hidden earnings problems. As 
a result, a larger amount of hidden bad news would be released to the markets, augmenting crash risk. 
Consistent with this expectation, the results reported in Panel A of Table 11 show that individualism has 
a larger positive effect on crash risk during the global financial crisis period of 2008–2009, while the 
incremental effect disappears in the post-crisis period of 2010–2013. That is, firms in higher 
individualism countries experienced more severe and more frequent crashes during the global financial 
crisis. 
< Insert Table 11 > 
6.5.2. IFRS adoption 
The International Financial Reporting Standards have been implemented in major developed countries 
(e.g., the European Union, Australia, and Singapore), aiming to improve listed firms’ financial reporting 
quality and to facilitate cross-country comparisons of financial statements in an era of unprecedented 
globalization. We investigate how this exogenous change in the formal accounting rules influences the 
informal individualistic culture’s impact on crash risk. We expect that the impact of individualism would 
be moderated by IFRS reporting, as its resultant enhanced financial reporting quality can constrain 
managers’ bad news hoarding ability (DeFond et al., 2014), lowering the individualism-induced crash 
risk. 
To test for this prediction, we construct the IFRS dummy, which denotes the firm-years following 
the full set of international standards or IFRS, using data collected from Worldscope. Panel B of Table 
11 shows that IFRS adoption attenuates the positive effect of individualism on crash risk. When the 
sample period is restricted to 2003–2013, eliminating the distortions of the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
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and the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the coefficients on IDV×IFRS become even more statistically 
significant. To mitigate the potential selection bias associated with firms that conform voluntarily to the 
IFRS before its mandate, we exclude voluntary IFRS adopters from the sample and find similar results 
(unreported). 
6.6. Individualism and crash size 
We study the impact of individualism on the size of stock price crashes. Our tests are focused on the 
firm-years in which at least one stock price crash occurred. Crash size is calculated as the mean of firm-
specific weekly returns over the crash weeks in a given year. A larger crash size is associated with a 
more negative yearly average firm-specific weekly return over the crash weeks. We replace the 
dependent variable of Equation (4) with crash size. Table 12 reports both the OLS and 2SLS regression 
results. We find that the mean firm-specific weekly return over the crash weeks falls with individualism, 
indicating that firms in more individualistic countries experience a larger drop in the stock price during 
crashes. 
< Insert Table 12 > 
6.7. Alternative explanation for crash risk—the discretionary disclosure hypothesis 
The above analyses center on the bad news hoarding theory, which is the basis of the majority of crash 
risk literature (e.g., Callen & Fang, 2015; Hutton et al., 2009; Jin & Myers, 2006; Kim et al., 2011a, 
2011b). In this theory, a stock crashes because its hidden bad news is suddenly released to the market. 
In contrast, Chen et al. (2001) explain the occurrence of crashes using the discretionary disclosure 
hypothesis. Their story rests on two assumptions: (1) managers have some discretion over information 
disclosure; and (2) managers prefer to announce good news quickly but leak bad news slowly. This 
behavior imparts a degree of positive skewness to stock returns, which represents a lower degree of crash 
risk. They further show that the positively skewed stock return pattern is more salient in smaller firms 
and in firms with fewer analysts (in other words, crash risk is lower in smaller firms and in firms with 
fewer analysts), as managers in these firms are less scrutinized, with more scope for making asymmetric 
information disclosure. 
To test whether our finding for individualism is borne out in the discretionary disclosure 
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hypothesis of Chen et al. (2001), we study how managerial discretionary disclosure ability as measured 
by firm size and analyst coverage interacts with individualism to affect crash risk. The results in Online 
Appendix Table A6 provide some evidence that the positive impact of firm size and analyst coverage 
on crash risk increases with individualism, which is consistent with the implication of Chen et al.’s 
(2001) hypothesis.   
7. Conclusions 
Using a large cross-country panel data set, we examine the effect of individualism, as a national culture 
dimension, on crash risk around the world. We find strong and robust evidence that firms located in 
more individualistic countries have higher crash risk. Our additional analyses reveal that foreign 
investors play an important role in transmitting overseas individualism to host-country recipient firms. 
Individualism can exacerbate bad-news-hoarding-related activities by managers—namely, risk taking 
and earnings management—which then elevate crash risk. Moreover, the positive relation between 
individualism and crash risk can be weakened by enhanced country-level financial information 
transparency. Our further evidence suggests that the high crash risk in individualistic cultures is driven 
by the heightened managerial bad news hoarding. Finally, we document a larger crash size in firms from 
more individualistic cultures.  
This paper has important implications for investors, regulators, and policy makers. First, investors 
should take into account the potential large cost of stock price crashes when making stock investments 
in high individualism countries. Second, to curtail crash risk, regulators in these countries should restrain, 
or at least closely monitor, managers’ crash-related risk taking and earnings management behaviors. 
Third, policy makers should carefully assess the individualism distance between foreign capital and the 
local market when deciding upon the market’s openness to foreign investors, in case domestic crash risk 
escalates. 
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Figure 1 Individualism and Stock Price Crash Risk 
The figures plot each country’s value-weighted average crash risk against individualism. Crash risk is measured 
by NCSKEW, DUVOL, and COUNT, respectively. Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 1 The Sample 
This table presents the distribution of sample firms across 42 countries for the period 1990−2013. #Firm-Years is 
the number of firm-year observations. #Firms is the number of firms. %Crashed Firms is the percentage of firms 
that experienced at least one crash week. 
 
Panel A: Crashed firms by country 
Country/Market IDV #Firm-Years #Firms %Crashed Firms 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Argentina 0.46 100 20 25.00 
Australia 0.90 5,298 1,103 31.19 
Austria 0.55 184 34 41.18 
Belgium 0.75 554 80 60.00 
Brazil 0.38 283 75 22.67 
Canada 0.80 7,695 1,581 35.74 
Chile 0.23 208 41 19.51 
China 0.20 167 21 66.67 
Denmark 0.74 808 110 55.45 
Finland 0.63 713 93 65.59 
France 0.71 4,228 620 50.97 
Germany 0.67 4,665 710 55.63 
Greece 0.35 1,204 214 32.71 
Hong Kong 0.25 5,004 886 38.37 
India 0.48 5,989 1,620 20.06 
Indonesia 0.14 1,250 229 34.50 
Ireland 0.70 183 30 40.00 
Israel 0.54 541 162 17.28 
Italy 0.76 1,312 208 36.54 
Japan 0.46 33,833 3,425 55.94 
Malaysia 0.26 4,747 776 36.08 
Mexico 0.30 501 66 46.97 
Netherlands 0.80 1,022 133 54.89 
New Zealand 0.79 286 47 51.06 
Norway 0.69 926 173 40.46 
Pakistan 0.14 443 81 30.86 
Philippines 0.32 494 79 39.24 
Poland 0.60 867 256 28.91 
Portugal 0.27 208 32 46.88 
Russia 0.39 242 75 14.67 
Singapore 0.20 2,732 509 35.56 
South Africa 0.65 1,506 230 33.91 
South Korea 0.18 8,391 1,448 33.29 
Spain 0.51 702 102 42.16 
Sri Lanka 0.35 192 80 7.50 
Sweden 0.71 2,278 369 48.51 
Switzerland 0.68 1,624 181 55.80 
Taiwan 0.17 8,891 1,363 31.25 
Thailand 0.20 2,550 386 45.08 
Turkey 0.37 1,379 214 51.40 
United Kingdom 0.89 13,345 1,979 65.59 
United States 0.91 54,059 6,632 64.88 
Mean 0.50 4,324 630 40.71 
Total – 181,604 26,473 48.01 
Panel B: Crashed firms by year 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
#Firms 1,398 1,481 1,788 2,393 2,842 3,114 3,447 3,864 3,923 4,252 5,709 5,927 
%Crashed Firms 16.60 14.72 14.65 14.79 12.63 14.71 12.39 16.15 13.15 11.90 13.07 13.41 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
#Firms 6,464 7,287 8,986 9,923 11,153 12,605 12,470 12,752 13,848 15,106 15,655 15,217 
%Crashed Firms 15.45 11.88 14.13 14.44 14.82 13.47 17.08 10.10 11.45 13.41 12.75 11.99 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
This table presents summary statistics and univariate test results for sample firms in 42 countries for the period 
1990−2013. A country-year is assigned into the High (Low) IDV group if the country’s individualism score is 
above (below) the cross-country median individualism score in the year. The country-level crash risk variables are 
computed as country-year averages weighted by the firms’ market capitalization. *** denotes statistical significance 
at the 1% level. Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
Crash risk:       
NCSKEW t+1 181,604 -0.155 0.741 -0.549 -0.158 0.224 
DUVOL t+1 181,604 -0.091 0.357 -0.322 -0.097 0.132 
COUNT t+1 181,604 -0.077 0.583 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Individualism index:       
IDV 181,604 0.629 0.275 0.460 0.710 0.910 
Control variables:       
NCSKEW_LAG t 181,604 -0.148 0.714 -0.538 -0.158 0.216 
SIGMA t 181,604 0.051 0.026 0.032 0.045 0.064 
ACCM t 181,604 0.858 1.614 0.234 0.388 0.711 
RET t 181,604 -0.152 0.141 -0.202 -0.099 -0.050 
DTURN t 181,604 0.000 0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
LEV t 181,604 0.211 0.180 0.042 0.188 0.334 
ROA t 181,604 0.017 0.157 0.005 0.042 0.084 
MTB t 181,604 2.305 2.729 0.852 1.475 2.604 
SIZE t 181,604 12.220 1.979 10.760 12.090 13.570 
GDP/CAPITA t 181,604 10.140 0.903 10.250 10.470 10.590 
GDP_GROWTH t 181,604 0.025 0.028 0.013 0.026 0.040 
MCAP t 181,604 1.094 0.700 0.673 1.022 1.314 
STKTURN t 181,604 1.211 0.720 0.699 1.105 1.464 
CR 181,604 1.931 1.030 1.000 2.000 3.000 
 
Panel B: Univariate analysis 
 High IDV  Low IDV Difference in Mean Difference in Median 
  N Mean Median SD   N Mean Median SD t-statistic Wilcoxon z-statistic 
Firm-level crash risk:           
NCSKEW 105,820 -0.097 -0.114 0.787  75,784 -0.235 -0.217 0.663 39.37*** 39.15*** 
DUVOL 105,820 -0.063 -0.070 0.367  75,784 -0.130 -0.132 0.338 39.64*** 38.96*** 
COUNT 105,820 -0.040 0.000 0.613  75,784 -0.127 0.000 0.533 31.49*** 30.33*** 
            
Country-level crash risk:           
NCSKEW 377 -0.059 -0.051 0.193  368 -0.154 -0.157 0.269 5.49*** 6.63*** 
DUVOL 377 -0.040 -0.039 0.107  368 -0.086 -0.090 0.142 4.96*** 5.94*** 
COUNT 377 -0.021 -0.007 0.162   368 -0.090 -0.059 0.206 5.09*** 6.14*** 
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Table 3 Individualism and Crash Risk 
This table presents OLS regression results for the impact of individualism on crash risk. All time-varying 
independent variables are lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable. Intercepts are included but are 
suppressed for brevity. Variables are defined in the Appendix. The t-statistics based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable= NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT 
 [1] [2] [3] 
IDV 0.148*** 0.071*** 0.096*** 
 [15.69] [15.70] [13.69] 
NCSKEW_LAG 0.046*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 
 [13.34] [15.13] [10.99] 
SIGMA 1.554*** 0.626*** 0.489* 
 [4.11] [3.42] [1.75] 
ACCM 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002 
 [2.61] [2.74] [1.63] 
RET 0.020 0.011 -0.104** 
 [0.30] [0.36] [-2.07] 
DTURN 0.657*** 0.418*** 0.291 
 [2.68] [3.45] [1.42] 
LEV 0.001 0.001 -0.008 
 [0.12] [0.28] [-0.96] 
ROA -0.003 -0.003 0.016 
 [-0.66] [-1.25] [1.57] 
MTB 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 [7.73] [7.86] [6.01] 
SIZE 0.041*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 
 [32.77] [33.67] [25.94] 
GDP/CAPITA 0.024*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 
 [9.03] [10.26] [6.26] 
GDP_GROWTH 0.290*** 0.120** 0.271*** 
 [3.03] [2.52] [3.58] 
MCAP -0.002 -0.003** 0.002 
 [-0.59] [-2.05] [0.74] 
STKTURN 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.006** 
 [2.65] [3.16] [2.22] 
CR -0.007*** -0.002** -0.008*** 
 [-3.09] [-2.29] [-4.64] 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.037 0.042 0.021 
N 181,604 181,604 181,604 
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Table 4 Individualism and Crash Risk: Instrumental Variable Approach 
This table presents 2SLS regression results for the impact of individualism on crash risk. The instrumental 
variables are the genetic distance between a given country and the U.S. (Genetic_Distance) and the country’s 
grammatical rule on pronoun drop (Pronoun_Drop). The t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by 
firm are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
  1st Stage 2nd Stage 
Dependent variable= IDV NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Panel A: IV=Genetic distance 
𝐼𝐷?̂?  0.093*** 0.041*** 0.068*** 
  [8.21] [7.46] [7.91] 
Genetic_Distance -0.041***    
 [-176.57]    
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.841 0.037 0.041 0.021 
N 181,604 181,604 181,604 181,604 
Panel B: IV=Pronoun prop 
𝐼𝐷?̂?  0.112*** 0.052*** 0.078*** 
  [10.10] [9.71] [9.40] 
Pronoun_Drop -0.450***    
 [-225.35]    
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.860 0.037 0.042 0.021 
N 181,604 181,604 181,604 181,604 
Panel C: IVs=Genetic distance + Pronoun drop 
𝐼𝐷?̂?  0.104*** 0.047*** 0.074*** 
  [9.62] [9.10] [9.09] 
Genetic_Distance -0.020***    
 [-44.71]    
Pronoun_Drop -0.277***    
 [-56.38]    
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.887 0.037 0.042 0.021 
N 181,604 181,604 181,604 181,604 
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Table 5 Hofstede’s Other Cultural Dimensions and Crash Risk 
This table presents OLS regression results for the impact of Hofstede’s power distance (PDI), masculinity (MAS), uncertainty avoidance (UAI), and individualism (IDV) on 
crash risk. Panel A presents firm-level regression results, and Panel B presents value-weighted country-level regression results. All time-varying independent variables are 
lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable. The t-statistics in brackets are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm in Panel A and by country in Panel B. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel C reports the cultural variables’ economic significance derived from the 
coefficients reported in Columns 10−12 of Panel B.  
 
Panel A: Firm-level regressions 
Dependent variable= NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
PDI -0.155*** -0.067*** -0.114***       -0.031 -0.007 -0.037** 
 [-9.28] [-8.23] [-8.94]       [-1.54] [-0.70] [-2.28] 
MAS    0.085*** 0.048*** 0.042***    0.113*** 0.059*** 0.064*** 
    [8.42] [9.52] [5.26]    [9.51] [10.11] [6.84] 
UAI       -0.092*** -0.040*** -0.067*** -0.035** -0.014* -0.030** 
       [-8.72] [-7.94] [-8.44] [-2.24] [-1.80] [-2.52] 
IDV          0.123*** 0.063*** 0.070*** 
          [8.23] [8.65] [6.14] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.036 0.041 0.020 0.036 0.041 0.020 0.036 0.041 0.020 0.038 0.042 0.021 
N 181,604 181,604 181,604 181,604 181,604 181,604 181,604 181,604 181,604 181,604 181,604 181,604 
Panel B: Country-level regressions 
Dependent variable= NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
PDI -0.167*** -0.084** -0.134***       -0.117* -0.065 -0.092** 
 [-2.77] [-2.13] [-3.24]       [-1.75] [-1.58] [-2.20] 
MAS    0.084*** 0.044*** 0.041    0.081** 0.041** 0.040 
    [3.19] [3.10] [1.67]    [2.58] [2.36] [1.16] 
UAI       -0.026 -0.009 -0.035 -0.010 -0.003 -0.017 
       [-0.52] [-0.34] [-0.69] [-0.23] [-0.15] [-0.32] 
IDV          0.095** 0.049** 0.075* 
          [2.27] [2.11] [1.78] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.163 0.170 0.092 0.158 0.165 0.083 0.153 0.161 0.083 0.169 0.175 0.095 
N 745 745 745 745 745 745 745 745 745 745 745 745 
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Panel C: Magnitude of economic significance 
    NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT 
PDI One standard deviation increase -24.83% -23.21% -37.64% 
 Change from min to max -102.65% -95.95% -155.56% 
     
MAS One standard deviation increase 15.21% 12.95% 14.47% 
 Change from min to max 68.77% 58.57% 65.45% 
     
UAI One standard deviation increase -2.31% -1.17% -7.57% 
 Change from min to max -9.81% -4.95% -32.15% 
     
IDV One standard deviation increase 22.23% 19.29% 33.82% 
  Change from min to max 69.01% 59.89% 105.00% 
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Table 6 The Culture Transmission Effect of Foreign Investors 
This table presents OLS regressions of crash risk on firm-level transmitted individualism. IDV difference due to foreign institutional investors is 
calculated as the weighted sum of the signed algebraic difference in individualism scores between the home country of foreign institutional investors 
and the host country, where the weight is set equal to the proportion of shares held by each foreign institutional investor. Delay 1 to global information 
measures the delay with which an individual stock’s price return responds to global market information, constructed following Hou and Moskowitz 
(2005). Delay 2 to global information is an alternative price delay measure proposed by McQueen et al. (1996). All time-varying independent variables, 
except the price delay variables, are lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable. The t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by 
firm are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable= NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
IDV 0.191*** 0.094*** 0.117*** 0.195*** 0.096*** 0.118*** 0.192*** 0.095*** 0.117*** 
 [14.25] [14.49] [11.35] [14.55] [14.70] [11.47] [14.31] [14.54] [11.39] 
IDV difference due to foreign 
institutional investors 
0.502*** 0.248*** 0.316*** 0.508*** 0.251*** 0.319*** 0.503*** 0.249*** 0.317*** 
 [4.94] [4.80] [4.46] [4.98] [4.82] [4.49] [4.96] [4.81] [4.47] 
Delay 1 to global information    -0.046*** -0.018** -0.019    
    [-2.93] [-2.45] [-1.58]    
Delay 2 to global information       -0.032*** -0.014*** -0.017** 
       [-3.47] [-3.18] [-2.34] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.041 0.046 0.022 0.041 0.046 0.022 0.041 0.046 0.022 
N 104,412 104,412 104,412 104,412 104,412 104,412 104,412 104,412 104,412 
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Table 7 Individualism, Firm Risk Taking, and Earnings Management 
This table presents OLS regressions of crash risk on the interactions between individualism (IDV), risk taking 
(SIGMA), and earnings management (ACCM). All time-varying independent variables are lagged by one year 
relative to the dependent variable. The t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable= NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Panel A: Individualism and risk taking 
IDV 0.112*** 0.052*** 0.072*** 
 [6.60] [6.32] [5.72] 
SIGMA 1.142*** 0.408** 0.210 
 [2.75] [2.01] [0.69] 
IDV × SIGMA 0.696*** 0.370*** 0.472** 
 [2.62] [2.77] [2.36] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.037 0.042 0.021 
N 181,604 181,604 181,604 
Panel B: Individualism and earnings management 
IDV 0.131*** 0.061*** 0.087*** 
 [11.79] [11.46] [10.10] 
ACCM -0.011 -0.007 -0.007 
 [-1.23] [-1.60] [-0.97] 
IDV × ACCM 0.026** 0.015*** 0.016* 
 [2.38] [2.83] [1.69] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.037 0.042 0.021 
N 181,604 181,604 181,604 
Panel C: Individualism, risk taking, and earnings management 
IDV 0.088*** 0.042*** 0.064*** 
 [4.42] [4.39] [4.38] 
SIGMA 0.794* 0.258 0.052 
 [1.87] [1.23] [0.17] 
ACCM -0.064*** -0.030*** -0.037*** 
 [-4.10] [-3.85] [-3.16] 
IDV × SIGMA 1.091*** 0.522*** 0.585** 
 [3.46] [3.30] [2.49] 
IDV × ACCM 0.069*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 
 [3.85] [3.55] [2.70] 
SIGMA × ACCM 0.970*** 0.450*** 0.535*** 
 [4.02] [3.73] [3.20] 
IDV × SIGMA × ACCM -0.994*** -0.448*** -0.504*** 
 [-3.64] [-3.28] [-2.65] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.037 0.042 0.021 
N 181,604 181,604 181,604 
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Table 8 Individualism and Country-Level Financial Information Transparency 
This table presents OLS regression results for the impact of country-level financial information transparency on 
the relation between individualism and crash risk. Financial Transparency, Prevalence of Disclosure, and 
Advanced Economy are used as proxies for financial information transparency. In Panels A and B, the High (Low) 
dummy equals 1 if the country’s transparency score is above (below) the cross-country median score in a given 
year, and 0 otherwise. In Panel C, the Yes (No) dummy equals 1 if the country is (not) an advanced economy, and 
0 otherwise. The t-tests for the coefficient difference between the two interaction terms are reported at the bottom 
of each panel. The t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable= NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Panel A: Financial transparency       
IDV × High_Financial Transparency 0.114*** 0.047*** 0.076*** 
 [8.68] [7.53] [7.86] 
IDV × Low_Financial Transparency 0.195*** 0.096*** 0.125*** 
 [10.38] [9.96] [8.54] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.034 0.039 0.019 
N 170,187 170,187 170,187 
Coefficient difference -0.081*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
  [-4.29] [-5.04] [-3.33] 
Panel B: Prevalence of disclosure       
IDV × High_Prevalence of Disclosure 0.035*** 0.015*** 0.011 
 [2.93] [2.68] [1.26] 
IDV × Low_Prevalence of Disclosure 0.129*** 0.062*** 0.078*** 
 [14.52] [14.58] [11.59] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.037 0.042 0.021 
N 179,078 179,078 179,078 
Coefficient difference -0.094*** -0.046*** -0.067*** 
 [-9.26] [-9.47] [-8.60] 
Panel C: Advanced economy 
IDV × Yes_Advanced Economy 0.128*** 0.060*** 0.085*** 
 [12.39] [12.22] [11.03] 
IDV × No_Advanced Economy 0.254*** 0.111*** 0.175*** 
 [7.82] [6.72] [6.85] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.037 0.042 0.021 
N 181,604 181,604 181,604 
Coefficient difference -0.126*** -0.050*** -0.089*** 
  [-3.68] [-2.91] [-3.33] 
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Table 9 Region-Level Individualism and Crash Risk within the U.S. 
This table presents OLS regression results for the impact of region-level individualism on crash risk of U.S. firms. 
IDV is the rescaled WVS individualism score of the geographic region in which the firm is headquartered. All 
time-varying independent variables are lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable. Intercepts are 
included but are suppressed for brevity. The t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are 
reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable=  NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
IDV 0.040** 0.016* 0.029** 0.044** 0.016* 0.027* 
 [1.98] [1.67] [2.09] [2.01] [1.65] [1.82] 
NCSKEW_LAG 0.021*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.018*** 0.009*** 0.006* 
 [4.51] [4.46] [2.70] [3.58] [3.94] [1.93] 
SIGMA 2.033*** 0.609** 2.441*** 2.094*** 0.690*** 2.489*** 
 [3.97] [2.30] [7.11] [3.74] [2.63] [6.59] 
ACCM 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.52] [0.39] [-0.46] [-0.57] [-0.89] [-1.08] 
RET 0.167*** 0.010 0.291*** 0.195*** 0.045 0.301*** 
 [2.68] [0.30] [6.94] [2.85] [1.37] [6.46] 
DTURN 0.927** 0.289 0.517 1.203** 0.406* 0.772** 
 [2.02] [1.23] [1.56] [2.43] [1.78] [2.17] 
LEV -0.011 -0.000 -0.022* -0.020 -0.006 -0.028** 
 [-0.60] [-0.02] [-1.86] [-1.01] [-0.70] [-2.15] 
ROA 0.108*** 0.046*** 0.073*** 0.114*** 0.049*** 0.072*** 
 [6.24] [5.04] [6.25] [6.01] [5.41] [5.53] 
MTB 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002** 
 [4.15] [4.13] [2.73] [3.74] [4.11] [2.53] 
SIZE 0.031*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.030*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 
 [14.79] [15.76] [11.73] [12.94] [13.03] [10.19] 
GDP/CAPITA -0.023 -0.025** -0.025 -0.028 -0.021* -0.036* 
 [-0.91] [-2.03] [-1.57] [-1.03] [-1.65] [-1.87] 
GDP_GROWTH 0.033 0.087 0.127 -0.033 0.056 0.082 
 [0.20] [1.02] [1.12] [-0.18] [0.66] [0.67] 
RELIGIOSITY    -0.009 0.001 -0.019 
    [-0.27] [0.03] [-0.80] 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.020 0.024 0.016 0.020 0.023 0.016 
N 39,517 39,517 39,517 32,536 32,536 32,536 
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Table 10 Individualism, Bad News Hoarding, and Stock Price Crashes within the U.S. 
This table presents univariate tests on the region-level individualism scores between treatment firms (i.e., restatement firms with crashes) and matched control firms 
(i.e., restatement firms without crashes). IDV is the rescaled WVS individualism score of the geographic region in which the firm is headquartered. The mean and 
median firm-specific daily returns are compared between the matched pairs for the pre-restatement period from day −3 to day −1 and the post-restatement period 
from day 0 to day +3, where day 0 is the restatement announcement date. *** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
      Firm-Specific Daily Return   Impact of Restatement 
on Net Income  
(% of total assets) 
  
IDV    (−3,−1)  (0,+3)   
  N   Mean Median SD   Mean Median SD   Mean Median SD   Mean Median SD 
Treatment firms                  
Restatements with crash 161  -0.19% 0.01% 0.019  -6.87% -4.90% 0.065  -2.64% -0.64% 0.056  0.710 0.766 0.199 
                  
Matched control firms                  
Restatements without crash 161  -0.36% -0.19% 0.019  -0.23% -0.25% 0.023  -1.35% -0.14% 0.038  0.669 0.672 0.215 
                  
Difference between groups   0.17% 0.20%   -6.64% -4.65%   -1.29% -0.50%   0.041 0.094  
(treatment − control)                  
t-statistic for the difference     0.76 1.32     -12.30*** -10.65***     -2.62*** -3.73***     2.83*** 2.04**   
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Table 11 Global Financial Crisis and IFRS Adoption 
This table presents OLS regression results for the impact of the global financial crisis and IFRS adoption on the 
relation between individualism and crash risk. Crisis is a dummy indicator of the global financial crisis period 
2008–2009. Post_Crisis is a dummy indicator of the post-crisis period 2010–2013. The IFRS dummy is set equal 
to 1 if the firm follows the full set of international standards or IFRS in a given year, and 0 otherwise. The t-
statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable= NCSKEW DUVOL COUNT 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Panel A: Global financial crisis 
IDV 0.132*** 0.061*** 0.093*** 
 [11.39] [10.88] [10.55] 
IDV × Crisis 0.089*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
 [4.93] [5.56] [3.31] 
IDV × Post_Crisis 0.007 0.007 -0.012 
 [0.45] [1.01] [-1.00] 
Crisis 0.044* 0.024** 0.021 
 [1.91] [2.16] [1.12] 
Post_Crisis -0.104*** -0.062*** -0.035** 
 [-4.70] [-5.89] [-1.99] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.037 0.042 0.021 
N 181,604 181,604 181,604 
Panel B: IFRS adoption 
1990–2013    
IDV 0.185*** 0.086*** 0.122*** 
 [16.81] [16.48] [14.88] 
IDV × IFRS -0.025 -0.006 -0.042*** 
 [-1.31] [-0.59] [-2.82] 
IFRS -0.014 -0.011* 0.009 
 [-1.16] [-1.89] [0.96] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.042 0.046 0.023 
N 176,920 176,920 176,920 
2003–2013    
IDV 0.223*** 0.106*** 0.143*** 
 [16.05] [16.71] [14.24] 
IDV × IFRS -0.065*** -0.028*** -0.064*** 
 [-3.09] [-2.74] [-3.99] 
IFRS 0.005 -0.001 0.019* 
 [0.37] [-0.20] [1.95] 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.041 0.046 0.022 
N 131,781 131,781 131,781 
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Table 12 Individualism and Crash Size 
This table presents regression results for the impact of individualism on the size of stock price crashes. The sample 
includes only the firm-years in which at least one stock price crash occurred. The dependent variable is crash size, 
calculated as the mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the crash weeks in a given year. In Columns 2–4, the 
2nd stage IV regression results are based on the fitted values of individualism generated from 1st stage regressions 
with IVs chosen as Genetic_Distance, Pronoun_Drop, and both of them, respectively. All time-varying 
independent variables are lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable. Intercepts are included but are 
suppressed for brevity. The t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable= Crash size 
  OLS   2nd Stage IV 
IVs=   Genetic distance Pronoun drop 
Genetic distance  
& Pronoun drop 
  [1]   [2] [3] [4] 
IDV -0.054***  -0.065*** -0.051*** -0.058*** 
 [-17.56]  [-18.95] [-14.97] [-17.37] 
NCSKEW_LAG -0.003***  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 [-3.70]  [-3.50] [-3.76] [-3.64] 
SIGMA -3.124***  -3.108*** -3.128*** -3.119*** 
 [-24.33]  [-24.21] [-24.39] [-24.31] 
ACCM -0.002***  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 [-5.88]  [-5.51] [-5.98] [-5.77] 
RET -0.167***  -0.165*** -0.167*** -0.166*** 
 [-7.11]  [-7.04] [-7.14] [-7.09] 
DTURN 0.209**  0.206** 0.210** 0.208** 
 [2.21]  [2.18] [2.23] [2.21] 
LEV -0.030***  -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.031*** 
 [-8.62]  [-8.94] [-8.55] [-8.73] 
ROA 0.088***  0.089*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
 [17.73]  [17.78] [17.74] [17.76] 
MTB -0.002***  -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 [-6.61]  [-6.26] [-6.69] [-6.49] 
SIZE 0.007***  0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 [19.85]  [19.96] [19.85] [19.91] 
GDP/CAPITA 0.001  0.003*** 0.001 0.002* 
 [1.31]  [2.70] [0.89] [1.74] 
GDP_GROWTH -0.185***  -0.189*** -0.184*** -0.186*** 
 [-5.09]  [-5.19] [-5.07] [-5.13] 
MCAP -0.006***  -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 [-5.54]  [-5.77] [-5.49] [-5.62] 
STKTURN -0.001  -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 [-0.80]  [-0.00] [-1.02] [-0.55] 
CR 0.002***  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
  [3.67]   [3.31] [3.77] [3.56] 
Industry-fixed effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.487  0.487 0.487 0.487 
N 24,266   24,266 24,266 24,266 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable Description 
NCSKEW The negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over a given year. Source: 
Datastream 
DUVOL The natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation of down-week firm-
specific weekly returns to the standard deviation of up-week firm-specific weekly 
returns over a given year. A firm-week is defined as a down (an up) week if the 
firm-specific weekly return is below (above) its annual mean. Source: Datastream 
COUNT The number of crash weeks minus the number of jump weeks over a given year. 
A firm-week is defined as a crash (jump) week if the firm-specific weekly return 
is 3.09 standard deviations below (above) its annual mean. Source: Datastream 
IDV The degree to which individuals focus on themselves and their immediate families 
over their societal groups. Source: Hofstede (2005) 
SIGMA The standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over a given year. Source: 
Datastream 
ACCM The three-year moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals, where 
discretionary accruals are calculated based on the modified Jones model (Dechow 
et al., 1995). Source: Worldscope 
RET The mean of firm-specific weekly returns over a given year, multiplied by 100. 
Source: Datastream 
DTURN The difference between the average monthly stock turnover over the current year 
and that over the previous year, where monthly stock turnover is calculated as 
monthly trading volume scaled by the number of shares outstanding during the 
month. Source: Datastream 
LEV Total debt divided by total assets. Source: Worldscope 
ROA Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. Source: Worldscope 
MTB The ratio of market value to book value of equity. Source: Worldscope 
SIZE The natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization (in constant 2005 US$). 
Source: Worldscope 
GDP/CAPITA The natural logarithm of the country’s GDP per capita (in constant 2005 US$). 
Source: World Development Indicators 
GDP_GROWTH The country’s annual GDP growth rate. Source: World Development Indicators 
MCAP The country’s stock market capitalization scaled by its GDP. Source: World 
Development Indicators 
STKTURN Total value of stocks traded divided by the country’s stock market capitalization. 
Source: World Development Indicators 
CR The country’s creditor rights index. Source: Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 
(2007) 
 
 
